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The Effects of Sectoral and Economy-
Wide Policies on Tobacco Production in
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Abstract
This study analyses the effects of specific agricultural and exchange rate policies on tobacco
production in the Dominican Republic. Direct protection resulting from output and input subsidies
and taxes was positive on average from 1966 to 1988, but total protection was negative when
exchange rate policies are considered. Tobacco policies were quite volatile and resulted in
increasing production in the 1970s but decreasing production in the 1980s. Overall, tobacco
productionwas 4.8 percentlessthan it wouldhave been had there been no policy interventions.
Several reasons are provided for the policies.
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Many governments in developing countries
suppress producer prices of agricultural commodities
through agricultural marketing boards, export taxes,
export grants, overvalued exchange rates, and other
policies. At the same time, these governments often
attempt to partly offset the resulting producer
disincentives by input subsidies (Krueger et al).
The combined effect of policies influencing
agriculture in developing countries is often to
discriminate against producers (Ballenger et al).
The result is reduced production, income, and
welfare due to inefficient use of resources.
Tobacco in the Dominican Republic is an
example of a commodity that has experienced
substantial government intervention over the past
several years in both input and output markets.
Export taxes, overvaluation of the Dominican peso,
and input subsidies have acted in a sometimes
countervailing but frequently discriminatory way
against tobacco, These policies, combined with
lower prices in world markets, have resulted in
reduced profitability for Dominican producers and
lower production.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the
effects of specific agricultural and exchange rate
policies on the tobacco indust~ in the Dominican
Republic, Effects on production, foreign exchange
earnings, and government revenue are considered.
Drawing on methods employed by Greene and Roe,
the net degree of protection or taxation resulting
from both direct and indirect policies is estimated.
A rationale is offered for why this particular policy
mix has prevailed in the Dominican Republic.
Finally, implications are drawn for agricultural
policies in that country.
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Dominican Tobacco Industry and Policies
Historically, tobacco has been one of the
most important agricultural commodities in the
Dominican Republic.. While it is the fourth largest
source of foreign exchange after sugarcane, coffee,
and cocoa, generating roughly 5 percent of all
foreign exchange in the country (Table 1), it is more
significant in terms of employment, Tobacco
planting, marketing, and processing employs more
than 300,000 people (Centro Dominican de
Promotion de Exportaciones). Tobacco generates
about 3 percent of the total value of crop output.
A comparison of tobacco to other major
crops in the Dominican Republic is presented in
Table 2. Sugar has historically been the crop that
produced the largest share of agricultural income,
Although its relative importance has declined over
time with the expansion of food crops and non-
traditional export crops, such as vegetables, sugar
remains number one in economic importance. Rice
is the most important food crop and production has
more than doubled over the past 30 years, Beans
are the second most important food crop and their
importance has grown over time.
Despite input subsidies, tobacco production
has declined from 18,390 metric tons in 1966 to
15,600 tons in 1990. However, substantial variation
in production has occurred from year to year due to
weather, pests, and price swings. For example,
production reached 56,000 tons in 1978. Production
and exports increased during most of the 1970s but
generally decreased in the 1980s, Tobacco
production in 1990 was particularly low due to a
combination of drought and low prices.
Most tobacco is produced on farms of I
hectare or less with heavy use of family labor and
low levels of technology (Bautista), Less than half
the farmers use chemical fertilizers or pesticides,
although these are still the major purchased inputs.
Dominican dark tobacco is considered one of the
best in the world due to low acidic and nicotenic
content and excellent combustibility. There are three
major varieties. Amarillo Parado is the dominant
variety, representing about 60 percent of total
production. Another 21 percent is Chago Dias
(fragrance tobacco) and 19 percent is Piloto Cubano
(Cuban seed tobacco). Almost all of the tobacco
produced in the Dominican Republic is dark tobacco
of which about two-thirds is exported. Dark
tobacco is primarily used in mixtures and blends for
pipe tobacco and cigars. Spain is the largest export
market.
The first major government intervention in
tobacco production occurred with the founding of
the Tobacco Institute (INTABACO) in 1962.
INTABACO is charged with improving the quality
of Dominican tobacco and protecting tobacco
growers. It donates part of the inputs that growers
use in dark tobacco production, including all seeds
and part of the fertilizers and pesticides.’ Since
1978, tobacco planting has been prohibited in the
southern and eastern parts of the country and
tobacco growers elsewhere are only allowed to plant
seeds distributed by INTABACO. The purpose is
to maintain or improve the quality of Dominican
tobacco.2
Other government interventions have
included prohibiting imports of light tobacco (used
in cigarette production) and its products since 1982,
and levying taxes on cigarette sales and tobacco
exports. The exporting sector has also been affected
by monetary regulations. For example, in 1983 the
Central Bank established a stabilization exchange
fund and an export compensation fund to provide
tobacco exporters with a more favorable exchange
rate than the official rate, which was heavily
overvalued at the time, In 1984, a monetary
incentive of 48 percent was added to the official
exchange rate for U.S. dollars earned from tobacco
exports. Despite this incentive, tobacco exporters
were still discriminated against compared to the free
or parallel market rate. In 1985, the exchange rate
used for tobacco exports was set equal to the
parallel market rate, but a 36 percent surcharge was
imposed on tobacco exports. The net effect of
exchange rate manipulations and surcharges has
been to tax tobacco exports in most years.
The Dominican peso (DR$) was officially
pegged at the rate of DR$ 1=US$ 1 from 1947 to
1985. Increasing current account deficits and high
inflation rates made this more and more difficult
after the mid 1960s. Transactions not only
increased in the parallel foreign exchange market
but became increasingly allowed until the official
rate was devalued in 1985. Maintaining the
separate exchange rates enabled the government toJ. Agr. aria’Applied Econ., July, 1993 153
Table 1. Value of Total Agricultural Exports for the Dominican Republic, 1966-1988 (Millions of
1980 US$)
Total Raw Green
Agric. Sugar coffee Cocoa Tobacco
Year Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
1966 713.54 338.33 92.51 49.34 44.30
1971 918.93 519.03 86.94 50.37 110.82
1976 706.02 383.07 143.39 63.87 56.61
1981 998.11 678,40 96.44 63.79 73.93
1982 789.81 471.10 156.98 96.88 30.55
1983 789.81 44~.~4 122.24 97.44 29.55
1984 961.85 509.34 161.12 128.86 37.69
1985 761.09 319.50 96,81 110.02 34.43
1986 659.86 213.12 168.95 98,83 37.39
1987 655.48 248.63 105.14 123.97 23,99
1988 628.80 228.46 106.43 112.06 29.45
Source: IMF, International Financial Sfaiisfics, Washington, D. C., various volumes,
Table 2. Production, Prices, and Value for Major Agricultural Commodities in the Dominican
Republic (1988)
.--,. ——
Selected Production Price Value
Commodities (1000 MT) (DR$/1000 MT) (Millions DR$)
Sugar 777 1,477 1,147
coffee 50 5,830 291
Tobacco 29 5,707 165
Rice 275 2,750 756
Red Beans 46 7,722 355
Corn 57 1,628 93
Casava 127 1,430 182
Source: Jesus de Los, Santos, “The Impacts of Trade and Agricultural Policies in the Dominican
Republic: A Sector Programming Approach. ” Ph.D. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, 1990.154 Penu and Norton: The Effects of Sectorul and Econnrny-Wide Policies on Tobacco
implicitly tax exports, reduce the cost of imports,
and keep food prices low.
The above dkicussion of government
policies indicates that tobacco production in the
Dominican Republic has been subject to diverse
forms of government intervention, particularly with
respect to the exchange rate. Measures of the
degree of these interventions and their effects are
presented below. While tobacco is not the only
commodity affected by government intervention in
the Dominican Republic, it provides an excellent
example of how policies can interact in a
countervailing yet discriminatory fashion to reduce
production incentives.
Methods
The degree of government intervention was
measured by calculating the nominal rate of
protection (NRP) and effective rate of protection
(ERP) for Dominican tobacco. The NRP measures
the degree of direct price intervention by
establishing the difference between domestic and
border prices. Three types of NRP’s are reported.
One, the direct nominal rate of protection, measures
the difference between the domestic and border
price evaluated at the official exchange rate. The
second, the total nominal rate of protection,
measures the combined effect of price policy and
exchange rate distortions. The third, the input-
subsidy-adjusted NRP, nets out the effect of input
subsidies on the first two NRP’s, In addition, the
direct and total nominal rates of protection for
tobacco relative to corn are presented.
The ERP includes the effects of
distortionary policies for both tradable outputs and
inputs by calculating the difference between value-
-added at the domestic price (including market
distortions) and value-added at the border price
(excluding market interventions). In other words,
the ERP is another method for taking into account
the effects of protective measures on both traded
outputs and inputs (Henneberry and Henneberry).
Several previous studies have calculated
NRPs and ERPs. A summary of a World Bank
study for a variety of commodities and countries is
provided in Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes. Greene
and Roe, as a part of the World Bank study,
calculated NRPs and ERPs for sugar, rice, and
coffee in the Dominican Republic. The current
study follows their procedures rather closely to
permit policy makers in that country to make
comparisons across commodities.
The first step in measuring the NRP of the
domestic tobacco price was to convert the prices
into equivalent product units at the same stage in
the marketing chain. Because the study was
primarily concerned with supply, the farm-gate stage
was used. The NRP was calculated on a percentage
basis, first at the official exchange rate, second after
adjusting for the exchange rate distortion, and third
after netting out input subsidies.3
The NRP evaluated at the official exchange
rate is (PPRT-BPRT)lBPRT, where PPRT = the
farmgate price of raw tobacco in DR$/MT and
BPRT is the estimated cost-adjusted border price of
raw tobacco evaluated at the official exchange rate.
Appendix 1 provides details on calculating NRP.
Calculating the NRP at the undistorted equilibrium
exchange rate (E*) involved substituting that
exchange rate for the official rate in the
calculations. For this study, E* was obtained from
Green and Roe for the period 1966- 1984. The
method described in their report and summarized in
Appendix 1 was used to calculate E* for 1985 -
1988.4
The ERP was calculated assuming that the
fertilizer tax or subsidy was the major traded- input
price distortions In order to calculate the ERP for
raw tobacco, the dk.torted value added in tobacco
production was determined using the producer price
of raw tobacco and the domestic price of fertilizer.
The undistorted value added in tobacco production
was determined by using the border price of raw
tobacco and the import price of fertilizer, both
evaluated at the equilibrium foreign exchange rate.
The difference between the distorted and the
undistorted value added divided by the undistorted
value added provides the measure of the ERP. (See
Appendix 1 for details.)
Once the degrees of tobacco price
distortions were calculated using these measures, the
effects of the government interventions on tobacco
production were assessed using the results of an
econometrical y estimated tobacco supply function.J. A~r. and Applied Econ., July, 1993
Observed annual tobacco production was compared
to the estimated output that would have prevailed
had producer prices been at their equivalent non-
distorted prices.
The estimated supply function is shown
below and includes the quantity of raw tobacco
regressed on the expected prices of tobacco and
corn, fertilizer price, and a time trend. Corn is a
substitute in production for tobacco in the
Dominican Republic, fertilizer is the most important
purchased input, and the time trend accounts for
technical change.
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The above equation was estimated using OLS with
data from 1966 to 1990. The coefficients on the
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explanatory variables have the expected signs and
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.f
The coefficients of this model were used to estimate
the effects of the policy distortions on production.
The low R* may reflect, in part, weather variability.
It also may be due to omitted variables on prices of
other inputs, for example, pesticides. These omitted
prices may be biasing the fertilizer price coefficient,
the implications of which are discussed below,
Nominal and Effective Protection Rates
The direct and total nominal rates of
protection and the effective rate of protection are
shown in Table 3. The direct effects of-output price
intervention are illustrated in column 1 and indicate
that tobacco production was subsidized 23.1 percent
on average from 1966 to 1988. The total NRP
when the exchange rate policy is considered is
shown in column 2. The official exchange rate was
overvalued each year and when this implicit tax is
accounted for, the total NRP implies that tobacco
was taxed 9.2 percent on average.
When the explicit input subsidies
(donations) are considered as well, the direct NRP
increases from 23.1 percent on average to 31.7
percent (column 3) and the total NRP is reduced to
an average tax of 4,6 percent. Thus input subsidies
by the Dominican government partly offset the net
taxation resulting from the exchange rate policy.
The ERP is reported in column 7,
Comparing the results in column 7 with those in
column 2 indicates that the effect of the fertilizer
tax or subsidy was relatively small. On average, the
explicit fertilizer price was 16 percent higher than
the border prices (column 5). However, when the
fertilizer price was evaluated at the equilibrium
exchange rate, fertilizer was subsidized an average
of 8 percent (column 6). The difference between
the ERP and the NRP evaluated at the equilibrium
exchange rate was small because fertilizer was a
relatively small component of total production costs,
Because fertilizer and other input prices are likely to
have been positively correlated, the omitted variable
problem mentioned above implies that even this
difference between ERP and NRP is likely to be
overestimated.156 Pena and Narton: The Effects of .fectorul und Ecanamy-Wide Policie.~on Tobacco
Table 3. Nominal and Effective Protection Rates for Tobacco in the Dominican Republic, 1966-
1988 (Percent)
NPRT NPRF NPR13 NPRIW NPRF NPRP’ ERPT









































































































































































































(1) NPRT = direct nominal protection rate for tobacco (reflects output tax or subsidy at the official
exchange rate)
(2) NPRP’ = total nominal protection rate for tobacco = (1) evaluated at equilibrium exchange rate
(3) NPRTS = direct nominal protection rate for tobacco when government input subsidies are
included
(4) NPRTS* = tots! nominal protection rate for tobacco when government input subsidies are included
(5) NPRP = percent difference between domestic and border fertilizer price at the official exchange
rate
(6) NPRT+’ = percent difference between domestic and border fertilizer price at the equilibrium
exchange rate
(7) ERPT = effective rate of protection for raw tobaccoJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993 157
The volatility of direct and indirect support
to tobacco is also evident in Table 3. There was a
tendency for negative support in the late sixties and
early seventies, positive support in the mid- 1970s,
and negative support in the 1980s. Support was
particularly negative in 1967 when output price
supports, input subsidies, and exchange rate effects
were each negative, causing production to drop in
1968,
Output and Foreign Exchange Effects
The direct and total output effects of
government policy interventions on tobacco
production are shown in Table 4, These effects
were generated using the estimated tobacco supply
function presented above. The observed annual
tobacco output (column 1) is compared first with
the estimated output that would have prevailed if
actual producer prices for tobacco had been equal to
equivalent border prices, evaluated at the official
exchange rates (column 2) and at the equilibrium
foreign exchange rates (column 4). The results
indicate that the direct government output price
subsidy for tobacco increased tobacco output an
average of 16,9 percent during the time period when
evaluated at the official exchange. However, the
results indicate that if the equilibrium exchange rate
had prevailed, tobacco output would have been 12.2
percent higher than it was, even without the direct
output subsidy,
The effects of government input subsidies
as well as the output interventions are illustrated in
column 6 for the official exchange rate and column
8 for the equilibrium exchange rate. The results
indicate that tobacco output was 29.6 percent higher
with the combined output and input subsidies than
it wouid have been without them, evaluated at the
official exchange rate. However, if the equilibrium
exchange rate had prevailed, tobacco output would
have been 4.8 percent higher than it was, even
without the direct output and input subsidies, In
summary, the direct output and input subsidies
increased tobacco production, but when the effects
of the overvalued exchange rate are considered,
tobacco output was 4.8 percent less than it would
have been had there been no output or input
interventions or exchange rate manipulation.
Because corn is a production substitute for
tobacco, an additional set of calculations was
completed to examine the implications of freeing up
both the corn and tobacco markets (Table 5), The
results indicated that at the official exchange rate
the net effects of subsidies to both tobacco and corn
reduced tobacco production by 16.6 percent because
the com subsidy was greater than the tobacco
subsidy. Had the equilibrium exchange rate
prevaiJed, tobacco production still would have been
9,3 percent less. If tobacco input subsidies are also
considered, production would have been 8.6 percent
less at the official exchange rate but 1.6 percent less
on average at the equilibrium exchange rate.
However, this average is dominated by a large
increase that would have occurred in 1975. In fact,
for the period 1966-1988, direct and indirect
government intervention on tobacco and com had
the net effect of reducing tobacco output in 16 of
those years. In summary, the tobacco output effects
of removing direct and indirect government
intervention were to reduce tobacco production but
the effects were less if protection was removed from
corn in addition to tobacco.
The net effect of all tobacco output price
intervention, tobacco input subsidies, and exchange
rate effects was to reduce foreign exchange earnings
from tobacco exports by roughly U.S. $600,000 per
year (2.4 percent) over the time period assuming no
influence of Dominican tobacco on world market
price. If all explicit and implicit government
subsidies and taxes were removed from tobacco
production, government revenues would have been
reduced an average of DR $18 million per year in
1985 DR$ (5.8 million US$) (See Peiia for
additional details).
Conclusions and Implications
Analysis of the effects of government
policy interventions on tobacco production indicates
that the direct effects of these policies subsidized
tobacco. However, the policy of overvaluing the
exchange rate resulted in a net tax on tobacco, an
exported crop, and a net subsidy on corn, an
imported commodity. Tobacco production and
foreign exchange earnings were reduced, but
government revenues were increased, by these
policies.158 Penu und Norton: The Effects of Sectoral and Ecanmny- Wide Policies on Tobacco
Table 4. Output Effects of Government Interventionson Tobacco Production in the Dominican
Republic, 1966-1988
QPRT QPDT Q1 QPTT Q2 QPDTS Q3 QPTTS Q4
1000 MT 10CX3 MT %A 10COMT 96A I003 MT ‘%A 1003 MT 90A



















































































































































































quantity of raw tobacco actually produced
quantity that would have been prcduced without direct output price intervention at the
officiaf exchange rate
percentage change in output resulting from direct price effects at the official exchange
rate
quantity that would have been produced without output price intervention at the
equilibrium exchange rate
percentage change in output resulting from output price and exchange rate interventions
quantity that would have been produced without direct output price intervention or
input subsidies at the official exchange rate
percentage change resulting from total policy effects at the official exchange rate
quantity that would have been produced without direct output price interventions or
input subsidies at the equilibrium exchange rate
percentage change resulting from totaf policy effects at the equilibrium exchange rateJ. Agr. and Applied Ecmr., July, 1993
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Table 5. Tobacco Output Effects of Government Interventions on Tobacco and Corn in the
Republic, 1966-1988
QPRT QPDC Q5 QPTC Q6 QPDCS Q? QPTCS Q8
100WT 100WT %A 1003 %A 1(XMMT %A 1000 MT 95A


























































































































































































































(1) QPi?T = quantity of mw tobacco actually produced
(2) QPDC = quantity that wouid have been produced without direct output price intervention at the
official exchange rate
(3) Q5 = percentage change in output resulting from direct price effects at the official exchange
rate
(4) QF’TC = quantity that would have been produced without output price intervention at the
equilibrium exchange rate
(5) Q6 = percentage change in output resultingfrom output price and exchange rate
interventions
(6) QPDCS =
quantity that would have been produced without dhct output price intervention or input
subsidies at the officiaI exchange rate
(7) Q7 = percentage change resulting from total policy effects at the official exchange rate
(8) QPTCS = quantity that would have been produced without direct output price interventions or
input subsidies at the equilibrium exchange rate
(9) Q8 = percentage change resulting horn total policy effects at the equilibrium exchange rate160 Penu and Norton: The ,!lffects of Sectarul and Economy-Wide Policies on Tobacco
Why did these policies prevail? Several
reasons are likely. First, a tobacco export tax is one
of the easiest taxes to administer. Second,
overvaluation of the exchange rate may provide a
short-term means of placing downward pressure on
inflation because it discourages exports and
encourages imports, Third, it is difficult for tobacco
producers to judge if implicit economy-wide
policies such as exchange rate manipulations more
than offset the visible output price and input subsidy
policies.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the
urban-industrial pressures for low-food price
policies and for policies that give breaks to
manufacturing industries were undoubtedly stronger
than the pressures generated by the tobacco
industry. There are likely to be several reasons for
this. First, urban unrest resulting from high rice and
corn prices can potentially bring down a
government. Second, urban-industrial groups may
have lower costs of gathering information and
undertaking collective action than the agricultural
community. Industrialists see overvalued exchange
rates as a means of importing cheaper capital.
Third, the tobacco industry itself is heterogeneous,
Tobacco producers favor higher tobacco prices,
while processors, and particularly exporters, prefer
lower (farm-gate) tobacco prices.
Bates has argued that government
interventions in markets facilitate the allocation of
political rents. Resources can be transferred to
supporters who control the marketing functions.
Unfortunately, efforts to reduce these interventions
therefore must overcome pressures from groups who
benefit from the existing policies,
The effects of output and input price
interventions in tobacco markets is to reduce
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Appendix 1. Methods for Calculating Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection
The Nominal Rate of Protection (NRP)
Direct NRP














@QPRT or QPRT = QPPTl@




Quantity of processed tobacco produced.
Quantity of raw tobacco produced.
The conversion ratio of tobacco in its raw form to its export processed form.
The domestic farm-gate price in DR$/MT of tobacco in its export processed
form (the producer price of processed tobacco).
The domestic farm-gate price in DR$/MT of tobacco in its farm-gate raw form
(the producer price of raw tobacco).
The observed domestic marketing margin between farm-gate and the exporter
for tobacco in DR$/MT of the farm-gate raw tobacco.
The observed domestic marketing margin between farm-gate and exporter for
tobacco in DR$/MT of the export processed tobacco.162 Pens und Norton: The Effects of Secford and Economy-Wide Policies on Tobacco
BPRT = The estimated cost-adjusted border price (DR$/MT) of raw tobacco evaluated
at the official foreign exchange rate.
BPPT = Border price of processed tobacco (f.o.b.) in US$/MT.
Emto = The estimated official foreign exchange rate.
MT(u) = The efficient domestic margin between the farm-gate and the exporter buyer
for tobacco in DR$fMT of processed tobacco.
NPRT = The nominal producer protection rate of raw tobacco evaluated at the farm-
gate and at the official foreign exchange rate.
Total NRP
The following equations describe how the NRP is calculated at the equilibrium exchange rate:
6) BPRT* = E*BPRT
7) NPRT* = [PPRT - BPRV]IBPRF
where,
E* = The undistorted equilibrium foreign exchange rate for tobacco in DR$fUS$.
BPRF = The estimated cost-adjusted border price (DR$/MT) of raw tobacco evaluated
at the equilibrium foreign exchange rate.
NPRT* = The nominal producer protection rate of raw tobacco evaluated at the farm-
gate and at the equilibrium foreign exchange rate.
To use equation 7 to calculate the total nominal producer protection rate for raw tobacco, the











(B/A) l’(e-n) = estimated equilibrium foreign exchange rate,
QD/[E*(l+TM)]n = constant in the demand equation for foreign exchange,
QS/[E*(l-TS)]e = constant in the supply equation for foreign exchange,
supply elasticity for foreign exchange,
demand elasticity for foreign exchange,
implicit import tarriff rate,
implicit export tax rate,
demand for US$ from the current account,
supply of US$ from the cucrent account.
The effects of other factors that influence the excess supply and demand for goods and services are
assumed to be captured through variables used to compute A and B, In summary, the annual
equilibrium exchange rates were derived from the estimated supply and demand for US. dollars in the
Dominican Republic as reflected by annual flows in the Dominican current account after removing the
estimated value of trade restrictions.
Direct NRP for Tobacco Relative to Corn
The direct nominal protection rate of tobacco relative to corn, the principal substitute in production for
tobacco. is calculated as:
8) RNPPTC = [(PPRTJPPC) - (BPPT/BPPC)]/(BPPT/BPPC) or RNPPTC = RPPTC -
RBPPTC/RBPPTC
where,
RNPPTC = Direct nominal producer protection rate for tobacco relative to corn.J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1993 163
RPPTC = The producer price of tobacco relative to corn at the farm-gate.
RBPPTC = The border price of tobacco relative to corn evaluated at producer equivalent prices.
The direct nominal producer protection rate of tobacco relative to non-agricultural goods (RNPPT), can
also be calculated, according to following formula:
RNPPT = [RPPTPNA - RBPPTPNAj/RBPPTPNA
If BPPT* represents the equivalent undistorted border price of tobacco evaluated at the equilibrium
foreign exchange rate and BPNA* the undistorted price of non-agricultural goods evaluated at the
equilibrium foreign exchange rate, then the total nominal producer protection rate of tobacco relative to
non-agricultural goods is:
9) RNPPTPNA* = [(PPRT/PNA) - BPPT*IPNA*)]I(BPPT*IPNA*
RNPPTPNA* = RPPTPNA - RBPPTPNA*IRBPPTPNA*
where,
PNA* = Price of non-agricultural goods evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate.
RNPPTPNA* = The total nominal producer protection rate of raw tobacco relative to PNA.
RBPPTPNA* = The adjusted border price of tobacco relative to non-agricultural goods at producer
prices,
The following transformation of equation 9 is used to calculate the total nominal protection rate of raw
tobacco relative to corn:
10) RNPPTC* = KPPRT/PPC) - (BPPT*jBPPC*)]/(BPPF/BPPC*)
or
11) RNPPTC* = RPPTC - RBPPTC*IRBPPTC*
where,
RNPPTC* = Total nominal producer protection rate of tobacco relative to corn.
BPPT* = Undistorted border price of tobacco evaluated at the equilibrium foreign exchange
rate.
BPPC* = Undistorted border price of corn evaluated at the equilibrium foreign exchange
rate,
Data sources: INTABACO Statistics Bulletin, various years; National Budget Office; Central Bank;
INTABACO Annual Report, various years.
The Effective Rate of Protection
The effective rate of protection (ERP) is calculated from:
ERPT = [VaT(d) - VaT(u)]/VaT(u)
where,
VuT(d) = PPRT - Pj(d)a~T = The prevailing or domestic value added for tobacco.
VuT(u) = BPRP - Pj(u)aJT = The undistorted or border value added for tobacco.
PPRT = Producer price of raw tobacco.
BPRT* = Border price of raw tobacco (DR$/MT) evaluated at the equilibrium foreign
exchange rate.
Pj (.) = The price of fertilizer,








In order to calculate the effective rate of protection for raw tobacco (EPRRT*) the distorted value added
in tobacco production [VaT(d)] has to be determined, using the producer price of raw tobacco (PPRT)
and the domestic price of fertilizer [Pj(d)]. To find VaT(u), the border price of raw tobacco evaluated
at the equilibrium foreign exchange rate and the import price of fertilizer at the equilibrium exchange
rate are used.
Endnotes
Sugarcane and rice are the two crops that use chemical inputs most intensively, The input subsidy policy is
not restricted to tobacco, and hence, the needs of these other commodities are likely to have influenced the
decision to subsidize fertilizer and pesticides.
However, less than 1,000 hectares of tobacco was grown in the southern and eastern parts of the country
prior to 1978, and hence, the prohibition had little effect on tobacco production,
A recent study by Pompelli and Pick also examined the pass-through of exchange rates and tariffs in Brazil
to U.S. tobacco import prices, The Dominican Republic, however, is a smaller player than Brazil in the
world tobacco market and it is likely that no pass-through of their policies occurs. Hence, that potential
policy effect was not considered in this paper.
The literature on the primary determinants of the supply and demand for foreign currency, and hence, the
equilibrium exchange rate, is quite extensive. Although there is no generally accepted consensus on the
correct procedure to estimate equilibrium exchange rates, recent studies by Krueger, Shiff, and Valdes;
Greene and Roe; and others have used procedures similar to ours. Krueger provides a review of exchange
rate determination.
Data indicate that pesticides, especially fungicides, are other major subsidized inputs. However, reliable
historical prices for these inputs do not exist.
The assumptions underlying the model (normality, homoskedasticity, linearity, and autocorrelation) were all
tested. Based on the results of those tests, the supply function was judged to be statistically adequate.
Unfortunately, one policy affecting tobacco and other agricultural commodities in the Dominican Republic
is absent from our study: research policy. Because policy decisions are made in a political economy
context, public policymakers may attempt to meet their objectives through a combination of price policies,
exchange rate policies, and research policies. Distortionary price and exchange rate interventions may make
sense to a particular county if they are more cost effective instruments than research for meeting non-
efficiency objectives. Hence, future policy research should focus on incorporating research policies as well
as price and exchange rate policies in the analysis.